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Abstract:  This paper investigates whether official Japanese intervention in the JPY/USD 
exchange rate over the January 1999 to March 2004 time period is effective. By integrating the 
official intervention data with a comprehensive set of newswire reports capturing days on which 
there is a rumor or speculation of intervention, the paper also attempts to shed some light on 
through which of the two channels, the signaling channel in a broad sense or the portfolio 
balance channel, effective Japanese intervention works. The results suggest that Japanese 
intervention is effective during the first 5 years of the sample and ineffective during the last 3 
months of the sample, thereby providing an ex-post rationale for why Japan intervened as well as 
for why the interventions stopped. Moreover, the results suggest that when Japanese intervention 
is effective, it works through a portfolio-balance channel. The results do not rule out that 
effective intervention also works through signaling. 
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  11. Introduction 
The literature on sterilized central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market is rich with 
conflicting and sample specific results in regards to whether intervention is effective in 
influencing exchange rates.
1 By contrast, there is little disagreement that if intervention is 
effective, it is effective through signaling (by carrying out intervention the central bank informs 
the market about its future policy intentions and/or fundamentals) or through portfolio balance 
effects (by carrying out intervention the central bank changes the relative demand and supply of 
imperfectly substitutable foreign and domestic assets).
2 While the literature on effectiveness is 
extensive, fewer empirical studies investigate the transmission channels of intervention.
3 The 
aim of this paper is to asses whether the recent 1999 to 2004 Japanese intervention is effective 
and to gain insight on through which channel effective intervention works.
4
  Specifically, the paper investigates whether Japanese intervention over the January 1, 
1999 to March 31, 2004 time period is effective in influencing day-to-day changes in the 
JPY/USD exchange rate.
  5 By integrating the official Japanese intervention data with a 
comprehensive set of newswire reports capturing days on which there is a rumor or speculation 
of intervention, the paper sheds some light on through which of the two channels, the signaling 
channel in a broad sense or the portfolio balance channel, Japanese intervention, if effective, 
works.
6  
                                                 
1 See Neely (2005) for a detailed overview of several recent intervention studies and their main results.  
2 See, for example, Edison (1993) for a detailed exposition of the signaling and the portfolio balance channels. 
3 See Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) for a study of the portfolio balance channel. See Fatum and Hutchison (1999) 
and Lewis (1995) for studies of the (monetary policy) signaling channel. 
4 Official daily data on Japanese intervention from April 1991 to present is publicly available. As of January 2009, 
there has been no intervention in the JPY/USD exchange rate since March 16, 2004. See Fatum and Hutchison 
(2006a) and Ito (2003) and others for studies of the effects of official Japanese intervention during the 1990s. 
5 Fatum and Hutchison (2005) show that Japanese intervention is sterilized. Ito (2007) provides institutional details 
of Bank of Japan intervention.  
6 Sarno and Taylor (2001) discuss, and Reitz and Taylor (2008) test, the coordination channel through which 
intervention works by sending a coordinating signal to the market regarding the “correct” or the equilibrium value of 
  2  In order to investigate which transmission channel of intervention is at work, three 
categories of intervention are defined: Actual intervention of which the market is aware (proxied 
by official intervention on days when there is a rumor of intervention), actual intervention of 
which the market is unaware (proxied by official intervention on days when there is no rumor of 
intervention), and perceived intervention when no actual intervention occurs (proxied by days 
when there is a rumor of intervention but no official intervention). Testing the hypothesis of 
effectiveness separately for each category of intervention provides insight on effectiveness as 
well as on the channel of transmission as follows. The signaling channel can only be at work 
when the market is aware of or thinks intervention occurs (otherwise a signal about future policy 
intentions and fundamentals will go unnoticed, in which case it is not possible for the signaling 
channel to function), thus effectiveness of the first and the third category of intervention is 
consistent with signaling. The portfolio balance channel can only be at work when an 
intervention is actually carried out (otherwise the relative demand and supply of foreign and 
domestic assets do not change, in which case it is not possible for the portfolio balance channel 
to function), thus effectiveness of the first and the second category is consistent with portfolio 
effects. 
  The existing literature combining intervention data with newswire reports of intervention 
typically uses firm newswire reports of intervention to indicate whether the market is aware of an 
intervention or whether an intervention is carried out in secrecy.
7 However, a firm report of 
intervention is typically on the newswire the day after the intervention the report refers to is 
carried out. For example, a firm report of the January 12, 1999 official Japanese intervention 
                                                                                                                                                             
the exchange rate in the face of persistent exchange rate misalignments caused by non-fundamental influences. The 
analysis presented in this paper does not distinguish between signaling in a narrow sense (e.g. signaling of the 
direction of future monetary policy) and signaling of information in a broader sense (e.g. coordination signaling in 
situations of non-fundamentals based exchange rate misalignments). 
7 See, for example, Dominguez and Frankel (1993b, chapter 7). 
  3operation is reported on the newswire on January 13, 1999. Therefore, whether or not an 
intervention is reported is generally a matter of “after-the-fact” information that can play no role 
in the contemporaneous exchange rate response to intervention. By contrast, rumors and 
speculation of intervention are generally picked up by the newswire the same day they occur. 
Accordingly, the analysis of this paper uses rumors or speculation of intervention rather than 
firm reports of intervention to indicate market awareness as well as market perception of 
intervention. 
  A premise of this approach is that not all interventions are carried out when a rumor of 
intervention is reported, and not all rumors of intervention are reported when intervention is 
carried out. As it turns out, over the full sample period under study, official Japanese intervention 
occurs on a total of 159 days while a rumor of intervention occurs on a total of 269 days. A total 
of 92 (of the 159) intervention days are also days on which a rumor occurs. Since not all official 
intervention days coincide with a rumor, and not all rumor days coincide with an official 
intervention, the data encompasses three official intervention-rumor of intervention 
combinations.
8 This facilitates the creation of the aforementioned three types of intervention 
categories and, in turn, the hypothesis testing of effectiveness separately for each intervention 
category.  
  The analysis also assesses the impact of official statements (sometimes referred to as 
“oral intervention” or “central bank communication”) and whether the first day of intervention 
after a day, or days, of no intervention, and whether the first day of no intervention after a day, or 
days, of intervention, significantly influence exchange rate movements. 
                                                 
8 There are four (two times two) official intervention-rumor of intervention combinations. Official intervention on a 
day when there is a rumor of intervention; official intervention when there is no rumor of intervention; rumor of 
intervention on a day when there is official intervention; rumor of intervention when there is no official intervention. 
However, since official intervention on a day when there is a rumor of intervention is equivalent to rumor of 
intervention on a day when there is official intervention, there are, effectively, only three different combinations. 
  4    The empirical approach of the paper builds on the work of Dominguez and Frankel 
(1993b) and their (OLS) estimations of daily effects of official Bundesbank and Fed intervention 
on the DEM/USD exchange rate over the 1982 to 1990 time period.
9 Using a standard GARCH 
time series methodology and a comprehensive list of macro news control variables (measuring 
the news surprise as the difference between official news announcements and results of surveys 
of expectations of these announcements conducted by Bloomberg during the days preceding the 
announcements), the findings of this paper show that for the January 1, 1999 to December 31, 
2003 time period, official intervention, whether or not the market is aware of the intervention, 
exerts a significant same-day influence on the JPY/USD exchange rate. The analysis does not 
detect a systematic and significant link between days when there is a rumor of intervention, but 
no intervention occurs, and the JPY/USD exchange rate.
10 For the first quarter of 2004, the 
analysis shows that neither actual intervention nor rumors of intervention alone have any impact 
on the JPY/USD exchange rate.
 
  The results, therefore, suggest that Japanese intervention is effective during the first 5 
years of the sample and ineffective during the last 3 months of the sample. This provides an ex-
post rationale for why Japan intervened as well as for why the interventions stopped.
11 
Moreover, the results suggest that when intervention is effective, it works through a portfolio-
balance channel. The results do not rule out that effective intervention also works through 
signaling.  
  Official statements in support of more intervention as well as official statements casting 
doubt on the likelihood of more intervention are both found to be insignificant. Moreover, the 
                                                 
9 The empirical analysis of Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) uses news reports of intervention to classify whether an 
intervention is secret or reported. They do not address through which channel effective intervention works. 
10 See Dominguez and Panthaki (2007) for an intraday study of perceived intervention. 
11 See Taylor (2006) for a discussion of the Japanese intervention “exit strategy”. 
  5analysis finds strong and robust evidence that for the January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2003 time 
period the first day of intervention following a no intervention day has a larger than average 
impact on exchange rates. Some sample specific evidence that the first day after intervention is 
associated with an adverse exchange rate adjustment is found. 
  The analysis does not attempt to address the inherent endogeneity problem concerning 
intervention studies, thus it is likely that the models are affected by simultaneity leading to an 
underestimation of the coefficient estimates (see, for example, Dominguez and Frankel 1993b 
and Neely 2005 for a discussion). Therefore, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates is not 
discussed in this paper. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the data. Section 3 presents 
the empirical approach of the time-series analysis. Section 4 discusses the results of the baseline 
model estimations as well as several extensions and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The official Japanese intervention data consists of daily volumes of intervention operations in the 
JPY/USD foreign exchange market. During the period under study, January 1999 to March 2004, 
all official interventions in the JPY/USD market are sales of JPY against purchases of USD.
12
Table 1 shows intervention data summary statistics. The table shows that Japan 
intervenes in the JPY/USD exchange rate market on a total of 159 days over the full sample 
period. On most intervention days the magnitude of intervention is substantial, with purchases of 
over USD 1,000 million on 113 days and only 20 days with purchases of less than USD 250 
million. The table shows that only 30 of the intervention days occur between January 1999 and 
                                                 
12 The U.S. government did not intervene in the JPY/USD exchange rate market during this period. 
  6December 2002, 82 intervention days occur during 2003, while 47 intervention days occur 
during the first quarter of 2004.
13
  In order to compare the exchange rate effect of interventions that the market seem aware 
of to interventions that the market seem unaware of and, in turn, attempt to shed light on through 
which transmission channel intervention works, rumors of intervention are taken into account. 
  The analysis distinguishes between a rumor of intervention and a firm report of 
intervention, and only incorporates the former for the following reason. A rumor of intervention 
occurs on the same day that the market thinks an intervention takes place, while a firm report of 
intervention typically occurs the day after the intervention has taken place.
14 Therefore, whether 
or not an intervention is reported is generally a matter of “after-the-fact” information that can not 
play a role in the contemporaneous exchange rate response to intervention. By contrast, whether 
or not an intervention coincides with a rumor seems a better indicator of whether the market is 
aware of the intervention operation the same day it is carried out. Moreover, whether the market 
is aware of the intervention operation may affect the same-day market reaction to intervention as 
well as trigger a same-day market reaction to the rumor itself (whether or not intervention 
actually occurs.)
 15
The Factiva search engine and a comprehensive combination of various search words 
(e.g. Bank of Japan, intervention etc.) are used to find the days with a rumor of intervention. The 
                                                 
13 Fatum and Hutchison (2006b) show that the described variation in intervention frequencies over the January 1999 
to March 2004 time period is consistent with the existence of three different intervention reaction function regimes. 
14 For example, a firm report of the January 12, 1999 official Japanese intervention operation is reported on the 
newswire on January 13, 1999. 
15 For completeness, Factiva was also gleaned for firm reports of intervention. For the full sample, a total of 31 firm 
reports of intervention were found. To compare, Chang (2006) finds 27 firm reports of intervention in the Wall 
Street Journal over the January 2000 to March 2003 time period. While most Bank of Japan interventions are 
unreported, no false firm reports of intervention were found. By contrast, more than half of the interventions under 
study coincide with a rumor and, furthermore, several “false” rumors of intervention (i.e. a rumor of intervention 
when no intervention takes place) were found. This further illustrates the importance of distinguishing between 
reports of intervention and rumors of intervention. 
  7second row of Table 2 shows that a total of 269 days across the full sample are associated with a 
rumor of intervention. Row three of Table 2 reports that 92 of the rumor days are also 
intervention days, i.e. 92 of the 269 rumors are “true”. Row four shows that, accordingly, the 
remaining 67 of the 159 intervention days in the full sample do not coincide with a rumor of 
intervention. For the full sample, as many as 177 rumor days are, in fact, “false”. The numbers of 
days associated with false rumors are reported in row five.
 16
Some studies suggest that official statements regarding threats of intervention or 
regarding the desired direction of future exchange rate movements (sometimes referred to as 
“oral interventions”) influence exchange rate. In order to take into account this possibility, the 
analysis uses the Factiva search engine to find, respectively, newswire reports of official 
statements in support of intervention and/or a weaker JPY (“positive statements”), and newswire 
reports of official statements suggesting that further intervention in the JPY/USD rate is not 
recommended or unlikely (“negative statements”). Rows six and seven of Table 2, respectively, 
report a total of 108 positive and 17 negative statements for the full sample period. 
The analysis follows Ito (2003) and others in using New York close quotes of the daily 
JPY/USD exchange rate.  The exchange rate data are obtained from Global Financial Data 
(GFD). 
Several studies have found unexpected macro news to impact day-to-day exchange rate 
changes.
17 Therefore, the analysis also incorporates a comprehensive list of macro news control 
variables. These control variables capture the surprise component of Japanese news regarding 
CPI, GDP, Industrial Production, Trade Balance, Unemployment and the surprise component of  
                                                 
16 It is not surprising to find a large number of false rumors of intervention. Chang (2006) reports a total of 282 JiJi 
News (local Japanese newswire) and Wall Street Journal reports of rumors and speculation of Japanese intervention 
over the January 2000 to March 2003 time period. Moreover, other studies question the accuracy of newswire 
reports of intervention (see Fischer 2006 and Osterberg and Wetmore Humes 1993).  
17 See, for example, Galati, Melick and Micu (2005) and Fatum and Scholnick (2006). 
  8US news regarding CPI, GDP, Industrial Production, Trade Balance, Unemployment, and 
Monetary Policy. For each of these macro news control variables, the surprise measure is the 
difference between official announcements and results of surveys of expectations of these 
announcements conducted by Bloomberg during the days preceding the announcements. 
The official value of a news variable is announced once a month, or at a lower frequency. 
The news control variables capture the associated surprise element on announcement dates, thus 
these variables are non-zero only on announcement dates and only when the announcement 
differs from market expectations.  
Summary statistics for the JPY/USD exchange rate and the macro news surprises are 
displayed in Table 3. 
 
3. Empirical  Analysis 
Studies of financial market time series in general and exchange rate time series in particular 
often find evidence of time-dependent variance in the residuals. Specifically, large and small 
errors tend to come in clusters and the size of the current error term seems dependent on the size 
of the previous error (see, for example, Engle 1982 and Bollerslev 1986). In order to address this 
issue of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH), the analysis of this paper follows 
Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) in estimating a regression equation with residuals modeled as a 
GARCH process. The basic empirical relationship of the analysis is given by the GARCH(p,q) 
specification: 
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where   is the first-difference in the log of the spot JPY/USD exchange rate; INT t s Δ
RUMOR is 
actual intervention (volume) that occurs on a day when there is a rumor of intervention (i.e. the 
variable INT
RUMOR contains actual interventions of which the market is aware); INT
NoRUMOR is 
actual intervention (volume) that occurs on a day when there is no rumor of intervention (i.e. 
INT
NoRUMOR contains actual interventions of which the market is unaware); RUMOR
NoINT is an 
indicator variable that takes on the value one when a rumor of intervention is reported but no 
actual intervention took place, and zero otherwise (i.e. RUMOR
NoINT captures days on which the 
market suspects an intervention takes place but no actual intervention occurs); PSTAT is an 
indicator variable that takes on the value one on a day when there is an official statement in 
support of intervention and/or a weaker JPY, and zero otherwise; NSTAT is an indicator variable 
that takes on the value one on a day when there is an official statement suggesting that further 
intervention in the JPY/USD rate is not recommended or unlikely, and zero otherwise; C is the 
coefficient vector associated with the control variables contained in Zt. The control variable 
matrix Zt contains the unexpected component of Japanese news regarding CPI (JPCPI), GDP 
(JPGDP), Industrial Production (JPIP), Trade Balance (JPTB), Unemployment (JPUNEMP) and 
the surprise component of US news regarding CPI (USCPI), GDP (USGDP), Industrial 
Production (USIP), Trade Balance (USTB), Unemployment (USUNEMP), and Monetary Policy 
(USFOMC). 
  10  Equation (2) states that the error term is normally distributed with zero mean and time-
dependant (conditional) variance  . Equation (3) shows that the variance depends on the 
squared error of the past q periods (the ARCH terms) and the conditional variance of the past p 
periods. 
t h
  Simultaneous estimations of equations (1) through (3) are carried out for the full sample 
and, to ensure that the results are robust, also for two truncated samples (Sub-Sample 1: January 
1, 1999 to December 31, 2002; Sub-Sample 2: January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2003). In 
addition, estimations are carried out separately across the January 1, 2004 to March 31, 2004 
period during which the intervention frequency is unusually high (Sub-Sample 3). For each of 
the exchange rate regressions, the most parsimonious GARCH specification possible that still 
allows for acceptance of the null hypothesis of no ARCH in the standardized residuals is 




Table 4 shows the GARCH(1,1) estimation results from regressing changes in the JPY/USD 
exchange rate on intervention of which the market is aware (INT
RUMOR), intervention of which 
the market is unaware (INT
NoRUMOR), and the indicator variable capturing rumors of intervention 
on days when no intervention occurs (RUMOR
NoINT). The models also include as explanatory 
                                                 
18 Fatum and Scholnick (2006) also find that GARCH(1,1) specifications give the better fit when estimating models 
of the JPY/USD exchange rate. They find GARCH(2,1) models to perform better when estimating models of the 
DEM/USD and the GBP/USD exchange rates. 
19 None of the GARCH specifications fit the Sub-Sample 3 data particularly well. Therefore, for Sub-Sample 3, only 
the baseline model is estimated using the GARCH approach. While extensions of the baseline model are estimated 
using GARCH(1,1) specifications for the full sample and for Sub-Samples 1 and 2, Sub-Sample 3 extensions are 
based on OLS estimations with Newey-West heteroskedasticity- and serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard 
errors (see Newey and West, 1987). 
  11variables the two indicator variables capturing intervention statements (PSTAT and NSTAT) as 
well as the 11 control variables containing various Japanese and US macro surprises.  
  The first column of Table 4 displays the results pertaining to the full sample (January 
1999 to March 2004). Both INT
RUMOR and INT
NoRUMOR are highly significant (at the 99 percent 
level) and of the correct (positive) sign, thereby providing evidence that actual intervention (i.e. 
JPY sales), whether the market is aware of the intervention or not, is, on average, associated with 
an exchange rate movement in the intended direction (i.e. JPY depreciation). By contrast, 
RUMOR
NoINT is highly insignificant, implying that, on average, a rumor of intervention is not in 
itself sufficient to elicit a detectable exchange rate movement.  
  As discussed earlier, evidence of effectiveness of intervention of which the market is 
aware is consistent with a portfolio-balance transmission channel as well as an information 
signaling transmission channel. Evidence of effectiveness of intervention of which the market is 
unaware is attributed to the former channel, while evidence of effectiveness of rumors of 
intervention on days when no intervention occurs is attributed to the latter channel.  
The significance and sign of both INT
RUMOR and INT
NoRUMOR suggest that intervention 
works through the portfolio-balance channel yet, at the same time, it is not possible to rule out 
that intervention may also work through the signaling channel. The insignificance of 
RUMOR
NoINT shows that no evidence of an information signaling channel is found. Taken 
together, a cautious characterization of the full sample baseline results is that the importance of 
the portfolio-balance channel is confirmed while no evidence of an information signaling 
channel is found. 
  Turning to the possibility that official statements (“oral intervention”) impact the 
exchange rate, the highly insignificant PSTAT and NSTAT variables clearly suggest that this is 
  12not the case. This is an interesting and, in light of existing studies such as Beine, Janssen and 
Lecourt (2004) and Fratzscher (2004, 2005) who find “central bank communication” to influence 
exchange rate markets, at a first glance a surprising result. However, considering the time period 
under study, the rejection of an influence of either “positive” or “negative” statements is perhaps 
less surprising. During the period under study, all interventions are unilateral, all interventions 
are carried out in the same direction (i.e. JPY sales), and the intervention frequency is 
remarkably high, especially during the latter part of the sample period. Therefore, it seems 
plausible that during the period under study there is very little uncertainty in the market about the 
desire of the intervening authority to depreciate the JPY and, accordingly, “positive” statements 
repeating or confirming this desire do not contain a sufficient degree of news to affect the 
market. Similarly, the insignificance of the “negative” statements may be due to the fact that they 
appear at odds with the actual intervention operations and, therefore, are disregarded by the 
market.
20
  The first column of Table 4 also shows that for the full sample some significant effects of 
Japanese macro surprises are detected, while none of the US macro surprise variables are 
significant. 
  The conditional variance equation estimates confirm the presence of ARCH effects in the 
exchange rate time series. The ARCH-F and Q
2 tests indicate that the full sample model is free of 
any ARCH effects left in the standardized residuals. Moreover, the standard F-test cannot reject 
the model specifications. This also holds true for the full sample model specifications reported in 
                                                 
20 Beine, Janssen and Lecourt (2004) analyze the impact of statements over the 1991 to 2003 period and Fratzscher 
(2004, 2005) analyzes the impact of statements over the 1990 to 2003 period. Their samples contain unilateral as 
well as coordinated interventions, intervention in opposite directions, and substantial variation in intervention 
frequencies. Both find that official statements impact the JPY/USD exchange rate. Fatum and Hutchison (2002) and, 
subsequently, Jansen and de Haan (2005) and others find some evidence that official statements influence the 
EUR/USD exchange rate. 
  13Tables 5 through 7 and for the Sub-Sample 1 and Sub-Sample 2 based models reported in Tables 
4 through 7. 
  The second and third columns of Table 4 report the results pertaining to the truncated 
samples. As the columns show, the Sub-Sample 1 and Sub-Sample 2 findings regarding the 
effects of intervention, rumor, and statement variables are identical to the previously described 
full sample. Overall, the results are robust across the full sample and Sub-Samples 1 and 2. 
  The fourth column of Table 4, however, reveals drastically different results. For Sub-
Sample 3, none of the intervention variables are significant and, furthermore, the standard F-test 
rejects the model specification altogether. In other words, while it appears that intervention of 
which the market is aware as well as intervention of which the market is unaware both influence 
the JPY/USD exchange rate over the 1999 to 2003 period, neither categories of intervention have 
any impact whatsoever on the JPY/USD during the first quarter of 2004.
21 As before, rumors of 
intervention on days with no intervention as well as intervention statements are insignificant.
22
 
4.1  Delayed Effects 
The baseline model estimations address whether the various intervention and statement variables 
are systematically associated with contemporaneous exchange rate changes, but not whether 
these variables are associated with delayed exchange rate effects. Exchange rate markets are 
generally perceived to be highly efficient and characterized by same-day processing of news. 
Therefore, any impact of intervention should be reflected in the exchange rate almost 
                                                 
21 Although the empirical method of Fatum and Hutchison (2006b), who introduce the matching methodology to the 
intervention literature, is different from the time-series analysis of this study, they also find a complete absence of 
effectiveness of official Japanese intervention during the first quarter of 2004. They conjecture that the lack of 
effectiveness during the first quarter of 2004 is related to the unusually high intervention frequency of this period. 
22 Sub-Sample 3 consists of only 64 observations and, therefore, results pertaining to this particular sample are 
interpreted with caution. 
  14instantaneously rather than subsequently. However, intervention of which the market is (initially) 
unaware may be associated with delayed as well as contemporaneous exchange rate effects in 
case the market subsequently becomes aware of the intervention (e.g. when the newswire reports 
the intervention the day after it occurs) and the intervention magnitude. If the market only 
subsequently learns about the magnitude of an intervention operation, the exchange rate may 
exhibit contemporaneous as well as delayed effects. 
  In order to account for the possibility of delayed exchange rate effects, Equation (1) of 
the baseline model is augmented to include five lags of the explanatory intervention and 
statement variables: 
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  Table 5 shows the results of simultaneous estimations of Equations (2) through (4). As 
the table shows, the baseline results regarding contemporaneous effects are completely robust to 
the inclusion of lags. While there is no evidence of any delayed exchange rate adjustment effects 
associated with neither intervention of which the market is aware nor rumors of intervention on 
days with no intervention (all lags of INT
RUMOR and RUMOR
NoINT are insignificant), the 
coefficient estimate associated with the first lag of intervention of which the market is unaware 
(INT
NoRUMOR) is significant and of the opposite sign (and of a smaller magnitude than the 
coefficient estimate associated with the same-day effect) when estimating the model across the 
full sample and across Sub-Sample 1. This is consistent with the notion that the market 
  15subsequently learns about intervention of which it is initially unaware and, accordingly, adjusts 
with a one-day delay.
23 This finding, however, is not robust across all samples and only 
marginally significant in the full sample.
24
  
4.2   First Day of Intervention and First Day After Intervention Effects 
The first intervention operation following an intervention lull may contain relatively more new 
information than intervention operations carried out on subsequent intervention days (i.e. the first 
day of intervention following a day, or days, of no intervention is more likely to surprise the 
market compared to subsequent intervention days when the market is more likely to assign a 
higher probability to the possibility of another intervention operation being carried out).
25 If this 
is the case, the first day of intervention following a no intervention day should have a larger than 
average impact on exchange rates. A natural extension of the baseline analysis, therefore, is to 
test the hypothesis that an intervention day succeeding a day of no intervention is particularly 
influential. In order to do so, Equation (1) of the baseline model is replaced by the following 
expression: 
 












NoRUMOR,NoFDI, respectively, are identical to INT
RUMOR and 
INT
NoRUMOR, respectively, except that the two former variables are set to zero on an intervention 
                                                 
23 For both the full sample and Sub-Sample 1, Wald-tests of the sum of the contemporaneous and the first lag 
coefficients confirm that the cumulated exchange rate effect is significant and of the correct sign. 
24 All lags of the statement variables are insignificant. For ease of exposition, neither the lags of the statement 
variables nor the macro surprises are reported in Table 5. 
25 See Dominguez and Frankel (1993b), Fatum and Hutchison (2006b), and Humpage (1988) for related work and 
support for the hypothesis that the first day of intervention has a greater effect than subsequent intervention days. 
  16day immediately succeeding a day with no intervention; FDINT is actual intervention (volume) 
that occurs on a day following a day with no intervention.
26
  Table 6 shows the results of simultaneous estimations of equations (2), (3) and (5). The 
full sample results (first column) show that the coefficient estimate associated with the first day 
of intervention is highly significant, of the correct sign, and substantially larger than either of the 
other two intervention variables. Clearly, this lends strong support to the claim that the first day 
of intervention following a no intervention day has a larger than average impact on exchange 
rates. The estimations based on Sub-Samples 2 and 3 repeat this finding (columns two and 
three).  
  The fourth column of Table 6 shows the estimation results based on Sub-Sample 3 (the 
first quarter of 2004). The Sub-Sample 3 results are, once again, drastically different. 
Intervention is generally ineffective, whether or not the market seems aware of the intervention 
or not (consistent with the baseline model estimation of Sub-Sample 3), and the coefficient 
associated with the first day of intervention is marginally significant and of the wrong sign. As 
before, the standard F-test rejects the model altogether, implying that, in contrast with the 1999 
to 2003 period, intervention does not influence the exchange rate during the first quarter of 2004. 
  As noted earlier, intervention tends to come in clusters. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
studies of what prompts central banks to intervene generally find past intervention to be an 
important predictor of future intervention (see Ito and Yabu 2007 for a recent study of Japanese 
intervention reaction functions). Specifically, the one-day lag of intervention is often the most 
important and consistently significant explanatory variable when estimating central bank 
                                                 
26 The baseline analysis as well as the augmented delayed effects model found the indicator variables regarding 
rumors of intervention on no intervention days and statements to be insignificant. Therefore, these variables are 
excluded from the rest of the analysis. The macro surprise control variables found to be significant in the baseline 
analysis are included in all estimations but, for ease of exposition, not displayed in subsequent tables.  
  17intervention reaction functions (see, for example, Fatum and Hutchison 2006b). However, the 
details of the Japanese intervention reaction function are unannounced, thus it is impossible for 
the market to know ex-ante with certainty when a cluster of intervention days will end. The 
exchange rate market is forward-looking, i.e. current expectations of future events are already 
reflected in today’s exchange rate.
27 Therefore, if intervention today induces the market to expect 
intervention tomorrow, but no intervention tomorrow is carried out, the first day of no 
intervention will “disappoint” the market and, accordingly, the market will adjust to “price out” 
what was incorrectly “priced in”. In other words, the first day of no intervention following a day 
of intervention may be systematically associated with an exchange rate movement in the 
opposite direction of what is intended with the preceding intervention operation (e.g. the first day 
after an intervention sale of JPY is associated with a JPY appreciation). 
  To test the hypothesis that the first day without intervention following a day with 
intervention plays a special role in the context of Japanese intervention and movements in the 
JPY/USD exchange rate, Equation (1) of the baseline model is replaced by the following 
expression: 
 




t t CZ FDAINT b INT b INT b a s ε + + + + + = Δ 3 2 1
 
where FDAINT is an indicator variable that takes on the value one on the first day of no 
intervention immediately succeeding an intervention day.  
  The results of the simultaneous estimations of equations (2), (3) and (6) are reported in 
Table 7. For the full sample, the FDAINT coefficient estimate shown in column 1 is positive 
                                                 
27 See, for example, Engel and West (2005) who state that “exchange rates and fundamentals are linked in a way that 
is broadly consistent with asset pricing models of the exchange rate”. 
  18(thus inconsistent with the hypothesized adverse exchange rate adjustment) and insignificant. 
Clearly, the estimations based on the full sample reject the hypothesis. However, the Sub-Sample 
1 results shown in column 2 support the opposite conclusion. For Sub-Sample 1, the FDAINT 
coefficient estimate is significant (at the 95% level) and negative, implying that, on average, the 
first day of no intervention following a day with intervention sales of JPY is associated with a 
JPY appreciation. Nevertheless, the Sub-Sample 2 results shown in column 3 repeat the full 
sample findings and, again, reject that the first day after intervention influences the exchange 
rate. For Sub-Sample 3, none of the explanatory variables are significant and the F-test rejects 
the model. In sum, while there is some sample specific evidence that the first day after 
intervention is associated with an adverse exchange rate adjustment, overall the results are mixed 
and invite further research rather than warrant any strong conclusions. 
  
4.3  Additional Robustness Checks 
In order to test the robustness of the results, the analysis is also carried out using different model 
specifications, different first day of intervention definitions, and different first day after 
intervention definitions. 
First, all estimations are also carried out using OLS estimation techniques with robust 
heteroskedasticity- and serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard errors. The results 
pertaining to the baseline model described in Equation (1) are reported in Table 8. As the table 
shows, all the previously described results regarding the intervention and the statement variables 
are completely unchanged across all four samples. In addition, the augmented delayed effects 
model as well as the models addressing first day of intervention and first day after intervention 
  19effects are re-estimated using OLS and HAC standard errors, yielding identical results to those 
reported in Tables 5 through 6.
28
Second, the analysis tests for the possibility that the conditional variance enters into the 
mean equations (Equations 1, 4, 5, and 6) but find no support for the GARCH-in-mean 
(GARCH-M) specification. 
Third, the definition of a first day of intervention is altered to take into account the 
stylized fact that intervention often comes in clusters. This is done by replacing the FDINT 
variable in Equation (5) with the variable FDINTCL, where FDINTCL is defined as actual 
intervention (volume) that occurs on a day following two or more consecutive days with no 
intervention. Simultaneous estimations of Equations (2), (3), and FDINTCL-(5) completely 
repeat the results reported in Table 6. As an additional robustness test of first day of intervention 
effects, FDINTCL is replaced by FDINTE, where FDINTE is defined as actual intervention 
(volume) that occurs on the first day of an intervention event.
29 The results using FDINTE in 
place of FDINT in Equation (5) are unchanged. 
Fourth, similar to the robustness check regarding the first day of intervention, the 
definition of a first day after intervention is altered. Replacing the FDAINT variable in Equation 
(6) with the variable FDAINTCL, where FDAINTCL is an indicator variable that takes on the 
value one on the first day of no intervention immediately succeeding two or more consecutive 
days of intervention. Simultaneous estimations of Equations (2), (3), and FDAINTCL-(6) 
completely repeat the results reported in Table 7 (i.e. the FDAINTCL coefficient estimate is only 
negative and significant for Sub-Sample 2). 
                                                 
28 These as well as the subsequently described robustness results are not reported for brevity but available from the 
author upon request. 
29 The event definition follows Fatum and Hutchison (2003). 
  20Given the oft-reported sensitivity of GARCH models to even slight specification changes, 
the discussed robustness checks suggest that the findings of the paper are highly robust. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes whether official Japanese intervention in the JPY/USD exchange rate over 
the January 1, 1999 to March 31, 2004 time period is effective. By distinguishing between 
intervention of which the market is aware and intervention of which the market is unaware, the 
paper also attempts to shed some light on through which of the two channels, the signaling or the 
portfolio balance channel, Japanese intervention, if effective, works. Intervention on days when a 
rumor of intervention is reported on the newswire is used as a proxy for intervention of which 
the market is aware, and intervention on days without a rumor of intervention on the newswire is 
used as a proxy for intervention of which the market is unaware. The analysis also assesses the 
impact of official statements (“oral intervention” or “central bank communication”) and whether 
the first day of intervention after a day, or days, of no intervention, and whether the first day of 
no intervention after a day, or days, of intervention, constitute days of particular interest in the 
context of intervention and exchange rate movements. 
  Using primarily a standard GARCH time series methodology, the results of the analysis 
show that for the January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2004 time period, actual intervention, 
whether or not the market is aware of the intervention, exerts a significant same-day influence on 
the JPY/USD exchange rate. The analysis does not detect a systematic and significant link 
between days when there is a rumor of intervention, but no intervention occurs, and the 
JPY/USD exchange rate. For the first quarter of 2004, the analysis shows that neither actual 
  21intervention nor rumors of intervention on no intervention days have any impact on the 
JPY/USD exchange rate.  
  The evidence of effectiveness of intervention of which the market is aware can be 
ascribed to the workings of the portfolio-balance channel as well as the information signaling 
channel. The evidence of effectiveness of intervention of which the market is unaware points to 
the former channel being at work. The analysis fails to find any evidence of effectiveness of 
rumors of intervention on days when no intervention occurs, thus no evidence directly supports 
that the latter channel is at work. The paper, therefore, cautiously concludes that the importance 
of the portfolio-balance channel is supported by the data while no direct evidence of the 
information signaling channel is found. 
  Official statements in support of more intervention as well as official statements casting 
doubt on the likelihood of more intervention are both found to be insignificant across all model 
specifications and samples. Clearly, this is in contrast with studies that find a significant 
exchange rate impact of official statements. However, the influence of official statements is 
likely sample specific, and since the sample under study contains nothing but frequent and 
unilateral JPY intervention sales it is unlikely that there is much uncertainty in the market 
regarding the desire of the intervening authority to depreciate the JPY. Accordingly, official 
statements made during the period under study do not contain enough new information to 
significantly affect the exchange rate market. 
  With respect to the first day of intervention, the analysis finds strong and robust evidence 
that for the January 1999 to December 2004 time period the first day of intervention following a 
no intervention day has a larger than average impact on exchange rates. Some sample specific 
  22evidence that the first day after intervention is associated with an adverse exchange rate 
adjustment is found. 
  Reaction function studies of Japanese intervention are generally at least modestly 
successful in modeling current intervention using explanatory variables such as lagged 
intervention and lagged exchange rate movements. It follows that intervention on any given day, 
whether or not the market is aware of the intervention operation, contains an expected as well as 
an unexpected component. A limitation of this and most other intervention studies is that no 
attempt is made to distinguish between expected and unexpected intervention.
30 A natural 
extension of the present study is to disentangle the unexpected component of official Japanese 
intervention and, in turn, reassess the effectiveness of unexpected Japanese intervention and the 
channels through which it works. 
                                                 
30 Exceptions include Fatum and Pedersen (2007), Galati, Higgins, Humpage and Melick (2007), Galati, Melick and 
Micu (2005), Humpage (1999) and Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000). 
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  26Table 1   Official Japanese Intervention January 1, 1999 – March 31, 2004 
 
 
Full sample: January 1, 1999 – March 31, 2004 
 
Purchases of USD (million USD)    Number of Days  Cumulated Amount 
>  1000        113    443,796 
>    500            21        16,613 
>  250                  5          1,694 
>      0                20          2,148 
Total        159    464,251 
 
January 1, 1999 – December 31, 2002 
 
Purchases of USD (million USD)    Number of Days  Cumulated Amount 
>  1000            28    147,629 
>  500                  2          1,799 
>  250                  0                 0 
>      0                  0                 0 
Total            30    149,428 
 
January 1, 2003 – December 31, 2003 
 
Purchases of USD (million USD)    Number of Days  Cumulated Amount 
>  1000            52    165,101 
>    500            11            8,864 
>  250                  4          1,465 
>      0                15          1,671 
Total            82    177,101 
 
January 1, 2004 – March 31, 2004 
 
Purchases of USD (million USD)    Number of Days  Cumulated Amount 
>  1000            33    131,066 
>  500                  8          5,950 
>  250                  1             229 
>      0                  5             477 
Total            47    137,722 
 
NOTES: 
(a)    This table is Table 1 in Fatum and Hutchison (2006b). 
(b)    Daily Bank of Japan intervention data obtained from the Japanese Ministry of Finance data bank. 
(c)    Daily intervention operations of USD 1000 million or greater: >1000; daily intervention operations of USD 
500 million or greater, but less than USD 1000 million: >500; daily intervention operations of USD 250 million or 
greater, but less than USD 500 million: >250; daily intervention operations of less than USD 250 million: >0. 
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Table 2                Summary Statistics: Days with Intervention, Rumors, and Statements 
  Jan 1999 to Mar 2004  Jan 1999 to Dec 2002  Jan to Dec 2003  Jan to Mar 2004 
   
Intervention 
(INT)  159 30 82 47
   
Rumors of 
intervention 
(RUMOR)  269 136 99 34
   
Intervention on days 
with a rumor of 
intervention 
(INT
RUMOR)  92 11 55 26
Intervention on days 
with no rumor of 
intervention 
(INT
NoRUMOR)  67 19 27 21
Rumor of 
intervention on days 
with no intervention 
(RUMOR
NoINT)  177 125 44 8
       
Positive statements 
(POSSTAT)  108 70 30 8
Negative statements 
(NEGSTAT)  17 17 0 0
 
NOTES: 
 (a)    INT is official intervention; RUMOR is a rumor of intervention; INT
RUMOR is intervention on days with a 
rumor of intervention; INT
NoRUMOR is intervention on days with no rumor of intervention; RUMOR
NoINT is a rumor 
of intervention when no intervention occurs; POSSTAT is an official statement in support of intervention and/or a 
weaker JPY; NEGSTAT is an official statement suggesting that further intervention in the JPY/USD rate is not 
recommended or unlikely. 
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TABLE 3            Summary Statistics: The JPY/USD Exchange Rate and the Macro News Surprises 
   Mean   Std. Dev. 
 
Maximum   Minimum   Non-Zero Observations 
JPY/USD  116.3350  7.81857  134.73 101.56 1364 
JP CPI  0.00394  0.001456  0.003  -0.002  33 
JP  GDP  0.001148 0.005362 0.018  -0.009  27 
JP Industrial Production  -0.002318  0.007961  0.015  -0.017  44 
JP Trade Balance  -6.6374  171.3451  367.10  -363.40  46 
JP Unemployment Rate  -0.0004  0.00161  0.002  -0.004  30 
US CPI  -0.00004  0.001536  0.003  -0.003  26 
US GDP  0.00175  0.006151  0.0120  -0.0110  12 
US Industrial Production  -0.000056  0.002936  0.0070  -0.0050  54 
US Trade Balance  -0.4917  2.3448  3.1000  -5.5000  24 
US Non-Farm Payroll Employment  -38.9032  101.6827  178.0000  -318.0000  62 
US FOMC  -0.00083  0.002887  0.0025  -0.0025  3 
 
NOTES:   
 
(a)      All data series run from January 1, 1999 to March 31, 2004. All data are five days a week (Monday to Friday). 
(b)      Data Sources:  The Exchange Rate Series is from Global Financial Data (New York close quotes). The Macro News Surprises are from 
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TABLE 4        JPY/USD Exchange Rate Responses to Intervention and Macro Surprises 
GARCH Models 
Daily Data: January 1999 to March 2004 (Full Sample) 










































































































































      
Variance Equation         


























      
Observations 1364  1040  1300  64 
R-squared 0.032  0.046  0.041  0.164 
S.E. of regression  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.006 
Durbin-Watson   2.037  2.006  2.030  1.758 
ARCH-F (Q
2) 0.53[0.47]  0.89[0.35]  0.64[0.42]  0.03[0.87] 
Q
2 (2)  0.58[0.75]  0.92[0.63]  0.64[0.73]  0.00[0.99] 
F-Stat 2.37***[0.00]  2.58***[0.00]  2.87***[0.00]  0.63[0.84] 
NOTES: 
 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 99%. 
(b)    Standard Errors (S.E.) in ( ) below the point estimates; p values in [ ]; lags in ( ) in Variable Names. 
(c)    GARCH estimations are defined in Equations (1) (2) and (3) in the text. 
(d)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the daily DEM/USD spot exchange rate (mean= -6.02E-05) for the full 
sample). 
(e)    The independent variable INT
RUMOR is the intervention volume on days with a rumor of intervention; the independent variable 
INT
NoRUMOR is the intervention volume on days with no rumor of intervention; the independent variable RUMOR
NoINT is an indicator 
variable that takes on the value 1 on days when there is a rumor of intervention but no intervention occurs, and 0 otherwise; 
POSSTAT is an  indicator variable that takes on the value 1 on days when there is an official statement in support of intervention 
  30and/or a weaker JPY, and 0 otherwise; NEGSTAT is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 on days when there is an official 
statement suggesting that further intervention in the JPY/USD rate is unlikely or not recommended, and 0 otherwise. 
(f)    Control Variables are measuring macro news surprises (difference between actual announcement and survey expectations 
extracted from Bloomberg) regarding Japanese CPI (JPCPI), GDP (JPGDP), Industrial Production (JPIP), Trade Balance (JPTB), and 
Unemployment (JPUNEMP), and US CPI (USCPI), GDP (USGDP), Industrial Production (USIP), Trade Balance (USTB), Non-Farm 
Payroll Employment (USNFPR), and Interest Rate Changes (USFOMC). 
(g)    Full Sample: January 1, 1999 to March 31, 2004; Sub-Sample 1: January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2002; Sub-Sample 2: January 
1, 1999 to December 31, 2003; Sub-Sample 3: January 1, 2004 to March 31, 2004. 
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TABLE 5        JPY/USD Exchange Rate Responses to Lags of Intervention 
Daily Data: January 1999 to March 2004 (Full Sample) 











































































































































































      
Variance Equation         
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Observations 1359  1035  1295  59 
R-squared 0.033  0.045  0.039  0.236 
S.E. of regression  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.006 
Durbin-Watson   2.02  1.994  2.009  2.011 
ARCH-F (Q
2) 0.70[0.40]  0.94[0.33]  0.91[0.34]  0.72[0.40] 
Q
2 (2)  0.72[0.70]  1.05[0.59]  0.98[0.61]  1.21[0.54] 
F-Stat 2.21***[0.00]  2.30***[0.00]  2.45***[0.00]  0.77[0.72] 
NOTES: 
(a)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the JPY/USD spot exchange rate. 
(b)    Sub-Sample 3 model estimated using HAC S.E. and Covariances. All other models estimated using GARCH. 
(c)    For all other NOTES refer to Table 4. 
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TABLE 6        JPY/USD Exchange Rate Responses to First Day of Intervention 
Daily Data: January 1999 to March 2004 (Full Sample) 
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Observations 1364  1040  1300  64 
R-squared 0.029  0.036  0.033  0.053 
S.E. of regression  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.006 
Durbin-Watson   2.028  2.010  2.028  1.831 
ARCH-F (Q
2) 0.54[0.46]  0.77[0.38]  0.53[0.46]  0.06[0.81] 
Q
2 (2)  0.55[0.76]  0.77[0.68]  0.53[0.77]  3.24[0.20] 
F-Stat 6.64***[0.00]  6.46***0.00]  7.30***[0.00]  1.12[0.35] 
NOTES: 
(a)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the JPY/USD spot exchange rate. 
(b)    The independent variable FDINT is the intervention volume on days succeeding a day with no intervention. 
(c)    For the purpose of the estimations displayed in Table 6, the independent variables INT
RUMOR and INT
NoRUMOR are set to 0 on 
days when FDINT is positive. 
(b)    Sub-Sample 3 model estimated using HAC S.E. and Covariances. All other models estimated using GARCH. 
(c)    For all other NOTES refer to Table 4. 
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TABLE 7         JPY/USD Exchange Rate Responses to First Day After Intervention 
Daily Data: January 1999 to March 2004 (Full Sample) 
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Observations 1364  1040  1300  64 
R-squared 0.023  0.040  0.031  0.04 
S.E. of regression  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.006 
Durbin-Watson   2.041  2.008  2.032  1.705 
ARCH-F (Q
2) 0.27[0.60]  0.75[0.39]  0.49[0.48]  0.01[0.92] 
Q
2 (2)  0.33[0.85]  0.87[0.65]  0.50[0.78]  4.02[0.13] 
F-Stat 5.42***[0.00]  7.25***[0.00]  6.97***[0.00]  0.80[0.50] 
NOTES: 
(a)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the JPY/USD spot exchange rate. 
(b)    The independent variable FDAINT is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 on days without intervention 
immediately succeeding a day with intervention. 
(b)    Sub-Sample 3 model estimated using HAC S.E. and Covariances. All other models estimated using GARCH. 
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TABLE 8        JPY/USD Exchange Rate Responses to Intervention and Macro Surprises: HAC Models 
Daily Data: January 1999 to March 2004 (Full Sample) 










































































































































      
Observations 1364  1040  1300  64 
R-squared 0.034  0.047  0.030  0.172 
S.E. of regression  0.006  0.007  0.006  0.006 
Durbin-Watson   2.017  1.994  2.015  1.715 
ARCH-F (Q
2) 2.67[0.10]  1.04[0.31]  2.32[0.13]  0.04[0.84] 
Q










(a)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the JPY/USD spot exchange rate. 
(b)    All models estimated using HAC S.E. and Covariances.  
(c)    For all other NOTES refer to Table 4. 
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